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This article provides an overview over the 
evolution of thinking about “culture” in 
the work of Raymond Williams. With the 
introduction of Antonio Gramsci’s con-
cept of hegemony culture came to be 
understood as consisting of not only 
shared, but contested meanings as well. 
On the basis of this redefinition by Wil-
liams, cultural studies was able to delin-
eate culture as the production, circulation, 
and consumption of meanings that 
become embodied and embedded in 
social practice
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Raymond Williams once described cul­
ture as one of the two or three most com­
plicated words in the English language. 
Cultural studies, mainly with the help of 
Williams himself, has gradually come to 
define culture as a material practice, what 
Williams eventually called a “realized sig­
nifying system.” In order to explain this I 
will outline the shift in his thinking about 
culture, from seeing it as a network of 
shared meanings, to seeing it as consist­
ing of both shared and contested mean­
ings. The latter position, I will argue, is a 
result of the introduction in the 1970s of 
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
into his thinking on culture. It is the com­
ing together of Williams’ concept of cul­
ture and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
that situates realized signification and 
power as the central object of study in cul­
tural studies.
In all his definitions of culture (see espe­
cially Williams, The Long Revolution; Cul-
ture; Keywords), Williams works with an 
inclusive definition of culture. Writing in 
1961, he proposed what he called the 
social definition of culture, in which culture 
is defined as
“a particular way of life, which expres­
ses certain meanings and values not 
only in art and learning but also in in­
stitutions and ordinary behaviour. The 
analysis of culture, from such a defini­
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tion, is the clarification of the meanings 
and values implicit in a particular way 
of life, a particular culture ... the charac­
teristic forms through which members 
of the society communicate.” (“Analysis 
of Culture” 32)
This definition is crucial to the develop­
ment of cultural studies for three reasons. 
First, Williams’ definition “democratically” 
broadens the then dominant Leavisite def­
inition of culture (Storey, Cultural Theory), 
producing a more inclusive definition, in 
which instead of culture being defined as 
a body of only “elite” texts and practices, 
ballet, opera, the novel, poetry, for 
ex ample, it is redefined to include as cul­
ture television, cinema, pop music, sport, 
for example. Second, culture as a particu­
lar way of life further broadens the defini­
tion of culture. So, for example, rather than 
culture being media as text, culture is 
embodied in the particular way of life that 
is involved in, say, the production, circula­
tion, and consumption of media. These 
two aspects of Williams’ definition are usu­
ally noted and the discussion ends there. 
However, there is a third element in Wil­
liams’ definition, one I think that is far more 
important for the intellectual formation of 
cultural studies than the other two: this is 
the connection he makes between culture 
and signification. The importance of a par­
ticular way of life is that it “expresses cer­
tain meanings.” Furthermore, cultural ana­
lysis from the perspective of this definition 
of culture “is the clarification of the mean­
ings … implicit in a particular way of life.” 
(The Long Revolution 57) In other words, 
in Williams’ social definition, cultures are 
networks of meanings that are embodied, 
performed and made concrete in particu­
lar ways of life. 
In Culture he further clarifies his position 
and redefines culture as “a realized signify­
ing system” (12), arguing that it is funda­
mental to the shaping and holding 
together of all ways of life. This is not to 
reduce everything to culture as a realized 
signifying system, but it is to insist that cul­
ture defined in this way should be seen “as 
essentially involved in all forms of social 
activity” (13). As he further explains, “the 
social organisation of culture, as a realized 
signifying system, is embedded in a whole 
range of activities, relations and institu­
tions, of which some are manifestly ‘cul­
tural’” (209). While there is more to every­
day life than signifying systems, it is 
nevertheless the case that “it would … be 
wrong to suppose that we can ever use­
fully discuss a social system without includ­
ing, as a central part of its practice, its sig­
nifying systems, on which, as a system, it 
fundamentally depends” (207). In other 
words, signification is fundamental to all 
human activities. Nevertheless, while cul­
ture as a realized signifying system is 
“deeply present” in all social activities, it 
remains the case that “other quite different 
human needs and actions are substantially 
and irreducibly present.” Moreover, in cer­
tain human activities signification becomes 
dissolved into what he calls “other needs 
and actions” (209). To dissolve can mean 
two quite different things: to disappear or 
to become liquid and form part of a solu­
tion. For example, if a parliament is dis­
solved it ceases to exist. However, when 
we dissolve sugar in tea, the sugar does 
not dis­ appear; rather it becomes an invis­
ible but fundamental part of the drink. It is 
the second meaning of dissolve that best 
captures Williams’ intention. So, to be 
clear, signification is fundamental to all 
human activities, but sometimes it is 
obscured by other needs and actions.
Culture, therefore, as defined by Williams, 
is not something restricted to the arts or to 
different forms of intellectual production, 
it is an aspect of all human activities. For 
example, if I pass a business card to some­
one in China, the polite way to do it is with 
two hands. If I pass it with one hand I may 
cause offence. This is clearly a matter of 
culture. However, the culture is not simply 
in the social act, nor in the materiality of 
the card, nor in the meaning of the card 
and act—it is in the entanglement of mean­
ing, materiality and social practice. More­
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over, the passing and/or receiving of a 
business card in China is not simply a sym­
bolic performance in which meaning is 
represented, it is a performative event in 
which meaning is enacted and realized. 
Similarly, as Marx observes, “one man is 
king only because other men stand in the 
relation of subjects to him. They, on the 
contrary, imagine that they are subjects 
because he is king” (Capital 55). This rela­
tionship works because they share a cul­
ture in which such relations are meaning­
ful. Outside such a culture, this relationship 
would have no meaning. Being a king, 
therefore, is not a gift of nature (or of a 
god), but something constructed in cul­
ture; it is culture and not nature or a god 
that gives these relations meaning: makes 
them signify, and, moreover, by signifying 
in a particular way they materially organize 
social practice. Therefore, as Williams 
insists, “Signification, the social creation of 
meanings … is … a practical material activ­
ity” (Marxism and Literature 34). It is a 
social practice that requires human agency 
and human interaction. It is not something 
abstract; it is always something embed­
ded in human action and interaction. To 
share a culture, therefore, according to 
this preliminary definition, is to interpret 
the world, make it meaningful and experi­
ence it as meaningful in recognizably sim­
ilar ways. So-called “culture shock” hap­
pens when we encounter radically 
different networks of meaning; that is, 
when our “natural” or “common sense” is 
confronted by someone else’s “natural” or 
“common sense.”
So far I have focused on culture as a sys­
tem of shared meanings. This is more or 
less how culture tends to be presented in 
Williams’ early work. Although I started 
with a quotation from The Long Revolu-
tion, the idea of culture as a realized signi­
fying system is in fact first suggested in his 
essay “Culture Is Ordinary.” The formula­
tion is quite similar to that found in The 
Long Revolution, “A culture is common 
meanings, the product of a whole people” 
(“Culture Is Ordinary” 8). Ten years after 
“Culture is Ordinary,” in “The Idea of a 
Common Culture,” he is even more explicit 
about the ordinariness of the making of 
meanings, “culture is ordinary ... there is 
not a special class, or group of men, who 
are involved in the creation of meanings 
and values, either in a general sense or in 
specific art and belief” (34). When Wil­
liams said that “culture is ordinary,” he was 
drawing attention to the fact that meaning 
making is not the privileged activity of the 
few, but something in which we are all 
involved. However, this does not of course 
mean that we are all involved in it in the 
same way; meaning­making, like all other 
social activities, is always entangled in 
relations of power. While we may all be 
involved in the making of meanings, it is 
also the case that some meanings and the 
people who make them have more power 
than other people and other meanings. 
Having said this, Williams’ early work is not 
totally unaware that power features in the 
embodying and social embedding of 
meanings. For example, in “The Idea of a 
Common Culture” he observes, 
“If it is at all true that the creation of 
meanings is an activity which en­
gages all men, then one is bound to 
be shocked by any society which, in 
its most explicit culture, either sup­
presses the meanings and values of 
whole groups, or which fails to extend 
to these groups the possibility of ar­
ticulating and communicating those 
meanings.” (35) 
In fact it would be very unfair to Williams 
to suggest that even in this early work he 
is simply unaware of power. The essay 
“Communications and Community” makes 
this absolutely clear: 
“For in fact all of us, as individuals, grow 
up within a society, within the rules of a 
society, and these rules cut very deep, 
and include certain ways of seeing the 
world, certain ways of talking about the 
world. All the time people are being 
born into a society, shown what to see, 
shown how to talk about it.” (21-22) 
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What is the case, however, is that he had 
not yet found a fully adequate way of 
articu lating the relations between signifi­
cation and power. In The Long Revolution, 
for example, he is still able to claim that 
culture is “the sharing of common mean­
ings … [in] which meanings that are val­
ued by the community are shared and 
made active” (55). Contrary to this, and to 
put it very simply, most meanings are not 
of our own making, they are generated by 
dominant groups and dominant institu­
tions. Moreover, these meanings tend to 
operate in the interests of dominant 
groups and dominant institutions. It is not 
until “Base and Superstructure in Marxist 
Cultural Theory,” Marxism and Literature 
and Culture that Williams really insists that 
signifying systems consist of both shared 
and contested meanings. As he consis­
tently argues from 1973 onwards, cultures 
are where we share and contest meanings 
of ourselves, of each other and of the 
social worlds in which we live. For instance, 
to return to an example given earlier, peo­
ple may recognize the meaning of the 
relations of kingship but reject and strug­
gle against these relations. Such rejections 
and acts of struggle are part of the pro­
cesses Gramsci calls hegemony. After the 
introduction of hegemony into Williams’ 
work in the 1970s, culture as a realized sig­
nifying system is always understood as 
consisting of both shared and contested 
meanings. Moreover, it is when Williams 
embraces Gramsci’s concept of hege­
mony that he locates culture and power as 
the object of study in cultural studies. 
Gramsci uses hegemony to describe pro­
cesses of power in which a dominant 
group does not merely rule by force but 
leads by consent: it exerts “intellectual and 
moral leadership” (“Hegemony” 75). 
Hegemony involves a specific kind of con­
sensus, a consensus in which a social 
group presents its own particular interests 
as the general interests of the society as a 
whole; it turns the particular into the gen­
eral. Hegemony works by the transforma­
tion of potential antagonism into simple 
difference. This works in part through the 
circulation of signification that reinforces 
dominance and subordination by seeking 
to fix the meaning of social relations. As 
Williams explains, 
“It [hegemony] is a lived system of 
meanings and values—constitutive 
and constituting—which as they are 
experienced as practices appear as 
reciprocally confirming. It thus con­
stitutes a sense of reality for most 
people … It is … in the strongest 
sense a ‘culture’ [understood as a 
realized signifying system], but a cul­
ture which has also to be seen as the 
lived dominance and subordination 
of particular classes.” (Marxism and 
Literature 110) 
If we substitute the word culture for hege­
mony we are very close to Williams’ social 
definition of culture. The difference being 
that the definition now includes relations 
of dominance and subordination. 
Hegemony involves the attempt to satu­
rate the social with meanings that sup­ 
port the prevailing structures of power. In 
a hegemonic situation subordinate groups 
appear to actively support and subscribe 
to values, ideals, objectives, etc., which 
incorporate them into the prevailing struc­
tures of power: relations of dominance 
and subordination. However, hegemony, 
as Williams observes, “does not just pas­
sively exist as a form of dominance. It has 
continually to be renewed, recreated, 
defended, and modified. It is also continu­
ally resisted, limited, altered, challenged” 
(112). Therefore, although hegemony is 
characterized by high levels of consensus, 
it is never without conflict; that is, there is 
always resistance. However, hegemony 
seeks to arrest the proliferation of mean­
ings; it seeks to reduce signification to 
meanings that can be controlled. For it to 
remain successful conflict and resistance 
must always be channelled and con­
tained—re­articulated in the interests of 
the dominant. 
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There are two conclusions we can draw 
from Williams’ concept of culture as a real­
ized signifying system. First, although the 
world exists in all its enabling and con­
straining materiality outside culture, it is 
only in culture that the world can be made 
to mean. In other words, signification has 
a “performative effect” (Austin, How to Do 
Things; Butler Bodies That Matter; Gen-
der Trouble); it helps construct the realities 
it appears only to describe. As Gramsci 
points out, 
“It is obvious that East and West are 
arbitrary and conventional (historical) 
constructions, since every spot on the 
earth is simultaneously East and West. 
Japan is probably the Far East not only 
for the European but also for the Amer­
ican from California and even for the 
Japanese himself, who, through Eng­
lish political culture might call Egypt 
the Near East ... Yet these references 
are real, they correspond to real facts, 
they allow one to travel by land and by 
sea and to arrive at the predetermined 
destination.” (Prison Notebooks 176) 
Moreover, as Gramsci continues, “East 
and West … never cease to be ‘objectively 
real’ even though when analysed they 
turn out to be nothing more than a ‘his­
torical’ or ‘conventional construct’” (175). 
In other words, East and West are histori­
cal constructions, directly connected to 
the imperial power of the West. However, 
they are also forms of signification that 
have been realized and embedded in 
social practice. Cultural constructs they 
may be, but they do designate real geo­
graphic locations and guide real human 
movement and organize real political per­
ceptions of the world. As Gramsci’s exam­
ple makes clear, meanings inform and 
organize social action. To argue that cul­
ture is best understood as a realized sig­
nifying system is not, therefore, a denial 
that the material world exists in all its con­
straining and enabling reality outside sig­
nification. As Williams makes very clear, 
“the natural world exists whether anyone 
signifies it or not” (Politics and Letters 67). 
But what is also absolutely the case is that 
the material (or the natural) world exists 
for us—and only ever exists for us—layered 
and articulated in signification. And how 
it is made to signify helps organize our 
relations with it. He had been aware of this 
since as early as 1961: 
“It is impossible for us to assume that 
there is any reality experienced by man 
into which man’s own observations 
and interpretations do not enter ... Yet 
equally, the facts of perception in no 
way lead us to a late form of idealism; 
they do not require us to suppose that 
there is no kind of reality outside the 
human mind; they point rather to the 
insistence that all human experience 
is an interpretation of the non­human 
real ity ... We have to think ... of human 
experience as both objective and sub­
jective, in one inseparable process 
... We create our human world.” (The 
Long Revolution 36, 54) 
The second conclusion we can draw from 
seeing culture as a realized signifying sys­
tem concerns the potential for struggle 
over meaning. Given that different mean­
ings can be ascribed to the same “sign” 
(that is, anything that can be made to sig­
nify) meaning­making is always a potential 
site of struggle. The making of meaning is 
always confronted by what Valentin Volo­
sinov identifies as the “multiaccentuality” 
of the sign (Marxism 23). Rather than 
being inscribed with a single meaning, a 
sign can be articulated with different 
“accents;” that is, it can be made to mean 
different things in different contexts, with 
different effects of power. The sign, there­
fore, is always a potential site of “differ­
ently oriented social interests,” and is often 
in practice “an arena of ... struggle.” Those 
with power seek “to make the sign uni­
accentual” (23): they seek to make what is 
multiaccentual appear as if it could only 
ever be uni­accentual. In other words, a 
“sign” is not the issuing source of meaning 
but a site where the articulation of mean­
ing (variable meanings) can be produced 
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as it is re-articulated in specific contexts. 
We continually acknowledge the multi­
accentuality of the sign when we describe 
an interpretation as, for example, a femi­
nist reading, a queer reading, a post­colo­
nial reading, or a Marxist reading. In such 
instances, we implicitly acknowledge that 
the text in question has been made to 
mean from the critical perspective of a 
particular reading practice. This is not sim­
ply an issue of semantic difference, a sim­
ple question of interpreting the world dif­
ferently. The different ways of making 
something signify are not an innocent 
game of semantics, they are a significant 
part of a power struggle over what might 
be regarded as “normal” or “correct”—an 
example of the politics of signification. It is 
about who can claim the power and 
authority to define social reality to make 
the world (and the things in it) mean in 
particular ways and with particular effects 
of power. Therefore, rather than engage in 
a fruitless quest for the true or essential 
meaning of something, cultural studies at 
its best fixes its critical gaze on how par­
ticular meanings acquire their authority 
and legitimacy. This makes culture and 
power the primary object of study in cul­
tural studies. As Hall explains, 
“Meanings [i.e. culture as a realized 
signifying system] ... regulate and or­
ganize our conduct and practices—they 
help to set the rules, norms and con­
ventions by which social life is ordered 
and governed. They are ... therefore, 
what those who wish to govern and 
regulate the conduct and ideas of oth­
ers seek to structure and shape.” (“In­
troduction” 4) 
Meanings have a “material” existence in 
that they help organize practice and they 
establish norms of behaviour. My exam­
ples of the passing of name cards in China 
and the relations of kingship are instances 
of signification organizing practice. More­
over, as Hall indicates, those with power 
often seek to regulate the impact of mean­
ings on practice. In other words, dominant 
modes of making the world meaningful 
are a fundamental aspect of the processes 
of hegemony. As Hall makes clear, “The 
signification of events is part of what has 
to be struggled over, for it is the means by 
which collective social understandings are 
created—and thus the means by which 
consent for particular outcomes can be 
effectively mobilized” (“The Rediscovery” 
123). On the basis of Williams’ redefinition 
of culture, cultural studies has gradually 
come to define culture as the production, 
circulation, and consumption of meanings 
that become embodied and embedded 
in social practice. To paraphrase what Wil­
liams said about communication systems 
in “Communications and Community” (22-
23), we cannot think of culture as a real­
ized signifying system as something which 
happens after reality has occurred, 
because it is through culture, as a realized 
signifying system, that the reality of our­
selves, the reality of our everyday lives, is 
constituted and contested—and always 
entangled in relations of power. 
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